There are some things you simply don’t farm out — and national security is one of those things

I am cheap.  Very cheap.  That means that I’m a bargain hunter.  I like used books and cheap clothes.  I prefer to buy American but, if my pocketbook tells me that America isn’t a good deal, I’ll usually follow my pocketbook.  Usually, but not always.  If buying something from another country would put me in danger, I don’t do it.  That’s why I don’t buy canned goods or, indeed, anything that goes in my mouth, from China.  The t-shirts may be shoddy, fading and ripping quickly, but they won’t poison me.  The food just might.  (I’d like to avoid Chinese honey, too, which is chock full of antibiotics, fungicides, and industrial pollutants, but the fact is that most of the major manufacturers that use honey as an ingredient buy cheap Chinese honey.)

Not only will I avoid products that will harm me, I’m also unlikely to pay someone for service if I know that the person’s agenda is hostile to mine.  You don’t have the local thief install your burglar alarm.  I don’t even need active hostility to back off.  I also won’t buy service from someone who doesn’t have a vested interest in doing a good job for me.

None of the above is rocket science.  It’s good old-fashioned common sense — which, of course, is the one thing government lacks.  This current administration, especially, seems to go out of its way to abandon common sense.

I mention all this now because of a news story that the MSM is ignoring, but that should matter to everyone concerned both with American national security and with the American economy.  Here’s the deal:

There may be additional heartening employment news in the same sector [Boeing got an air tanker deal], following a request by the U.S. Air Force to identify suppliers for a new kind of airplane that can perform the light attack and armed reconnaissance (LAAR) missions that are being requested by our military leaders.

The new aircraft’s purpose is to allow our U.S. pilots to more effectively execute the tactics, maneuvers and procedures that are needed for the type of counter insurgency warfare that we are currently seeing in Afghanistan and other conflict zones around the globe. In turn, these American pilots will train their partners and developing nation counterparts to fly these same planes and defend themselves, with a goal of reducing the need for U.S. military presence in the region.

Two companies are vying for the Air Force contract — Hawker Beechcraft, a Kansas-based company, and Embraer, a Brazilian owned and operated company.

The Red State article to which I linked explains that Hawker Beechcraft has a good history and a good product.  I’m sure that’s true.  I’ll even stipulate that Embraer also has a good history and a good product.  My question, though, is why in the world our government, which has never before been constrained by bargain shopping and common  sense, is willingly giving another country the blueprints for and access to one of our military products?

Here’s a perfect anecdote to illustrate my concerns:  Think back to 1976 and the Entebbe rescue mission.  The Israeli military’s raid on Entebbe to rescue hostages is one of the great stories of derring-do, intelligent planning, heroism, and creative thinking.  But it was also made possible by one significant fact:  More than a decade before the hostage-taking, an Israeli company had built the airport.  This meant that Israel had the plans.  As it happened, back in 1976, the fact that a non-Ugandan company had this type of information was the best thing that could have happened, helping the good guys win, and soundly defeating and humiliating the bad guys.

In this case, though, we’re the good guys.  I’d classify the Brazilians as the neutral guys for now, although their decision to follow in our footsteps and elect an anti-capitalist president is worrying.  While I believe and hope that Americans can and will shake off the Obama’s pernicious socialism, it’s not so clear that Brazil will.  If Venezuela is any guide, once socialism is firmly ensconced in a Latin American government, that government is no friend of ours.  Even without that specific scenario, though, the fact is taht one never knows what will happen in another country.  Right now, we’re witnessing events in the Middle East that caught the West entirely flatfooted.  Today’s friend is tomorrow’s enemy.

The whole friend/enemy thing is tolerable if you’re talking about buying t-shirts and canned foods or tables and cars from your frenemy, but it comes much more fraught when you’re talking about national security.  The optimal situation is one in which no country, Brazil included, knows too much about a “new kind of airplane that can perform the light attack and armed reconnaissance missions that” are part of modern American military tactics. Ten years from now, when the world has shifted, we may find ourselves bitterly regretting placing that information in another’s hands.

In addition to the security angle, there’ s also a matter of steering tax dollars, especially during a big recession.  It’s one thing for the marketplace to make decisions about where the money flows.  If I want to send my money to China, well, that’s my choice.  If enough people do that, than China gets rich or American companies figure out how to compete.  The government, though, is not the marketplace.  We’re not talking millions of customers making market-responsive decisions.  Instead, we’re talking about a huge, unwieldy, unresponsive bureaucracy taking millions and millions of dollars that taxpayers are forced to hand over to the government, and then sending it far, far away from the taxpayers.  This makes sense if the American market cannot supply the product — but we know that, in this case, the American market, made up of American taxpayers, is perfectly capable of providing the product.  There is therefore, no economic reason to ship our security over seas.

My congress people are Barbara Boxer, Dianne Feinstein and Lynn Woolsey.  In other words, contacting them is about as useful as using tweezers to move mountains.  If you’re in a district that boasts slightly responsive congress people, though, let them know your concerns about this deal.  Sending military airplane manufacturing out of the country is bad for national security and bad for the economy.

Out of sight, out of mind

Zombie believes that the Berkeley City Council, with its unerring instinct for getting to the heart of the matter, and then going in the wrong direction, is on to something with its decision to laud Bradley Manning as a great American hero.  After all, while Assange gets the fame, it was Manning who got the documents.  This means that it was Manning who engaged in acts of espionage and committed treason against his own country.

The problem for the media, though, is that Manning is invisible.  Assange is a showman.  He may not be the most ept showman, but he’s still out there shilling like crazy, while Manning is in prison.  In our visually oriented, headline driven society, that makes Manning irrelevant, despite the fact that he is the “but for” cause of the whole document leak kerfuffle.

Wikileaks

I have been, I suppose, almost remarkably silent about the whole wikileaks fiasco.  The data drop is of such enormous proportions, it’s actually difficult for me to process all the implications.  I have, however, got a laundry list in mind of some conclusions to be drawn and some of the things it means, which I’ll just drop here in no particular order.

1.  This is truly Pandora’s box.  Once opened, it cannot be closed again.  This does not mean, however, that the U.S. government should do what it is doing regarding Assange — namely, nothing.  If he is allowed to get away with this, the U.S. will have given carte blanche to other, similarly situated anti-U.S. anarchists.  The purpose of punishment, after all, isn’t simply to make the wrong-doer suffer; it’s also to serve as a grim deterrent for others contemplating the same type of action.  Dragging Assange back to Sweden to face pseudo-rape charges (pseudo because of Sweden’s bizarre rape laws) scarcely suits anyone’s notion of the punishment fitting the crime.

2.  To switch metaphors, I’ll abandon Pandora, and move to Rorschach.  If nothing else, the way different people have latched onto the documents is a fascinating insight into their political, social and economic desires.  To conservatives, the documents vindicate long-held beliefs about Iran; about the fear it inspires in the Arab world; about the Obama administration’s ineptitude; about Hillary’s bungling and deviousness; about Israel’s intelligent navigation of impossibly difficult situations; etc.  To liberals, it proves that the U.S. is evil and addicted to oil.  (That last is from Tom Friedman, who’s been repeating the same trope for more than a decade, even as he cheers on cutting off any avenues to oil independence, such as domestic drilling or nuclear power.)  To the Arab world, it is, of course, all the Joooos’ fault, as is everything.  Gosh, if only the Jews had more fun and got better press from their omnipotence.

3.  The leaks are undoubtedly evil.  People who have helped America are now at risk.  People who might have helped America (thereby saving American and allied lives) will refuse to do so.  America’s vulnerabilities around the world now have big targets drawn on them.  We can assume that the next round of leaks will be even more damaging.  Assange has been consistently upping the ante, and rumor has it that the next leaks will involve Gitmo and other topics near and dear to America-haters’ hearts.

4.  All of the above means that this is a game-changer.  Much as it is tempting to assume that governments and people around the world, out of long-term self-defense, will adopt an ostrich strategy and try to pretend none of this happened (much as one would ignore a loud burp at a fancy dinner party), the implications are too extreme.  Assange has proven that there is no information that can truly be protected (and that’s a comforting thought in an ObamaCare age, isn’t it?).  The “bodyguard of lies” that surrounds our nation’s — indeed, all nations’ — national security has been massacred.  It no longer exists.  We now live in a binary world that sees either no secrets or only secrets, both of which are equally dangerous to freedom and security.

Wikileaks — obvious, yet still dangerous, stuff spread by wicked people and useful idiots *UPDATED*

I haven’t had time (nor do I have the will) to pay close attention to the myriad revelations in the Wikileaks documents.  My overall sense, though, is that, fact-wise, there is nothing new here — or, at least, nothing new to those of us paying attention.  All of us at Bookworm Room have known that Saudi Arabia is terrified of a nuclear Iran, and I’ve posited for years that this fear would drive the non-nuclearized Arab nations closer to Israel.  For all their huffery and puffery, the Arabs have always known that Israel will not use the bomb unless provoked, whereas they fully understand that a nuclear Iran is a truly armed and dangerous rogue nation.

Speaking of rogue nations, we have also known that China has happily provided nuclear technology to any bad actor willing to pay for it.  Nothing new here.  Move along.  Don’t crowd the sidewalk.

The fact that the Wikileaks material is factually uninteresting, though, doesn’t change its spectacular capacity for being damaging.  Max Boot, I think, puts it as well as anyone can, in a post telling titled “Journalism that knows no shame“:

One can understand if the editors of the New York Times, Guardian, and Der Spiegel have no respect for the secrecy needed to wage war successfully — especially unpopular wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are, after all, the sorts of people who, over a few drinks, would no doubt tell you that diplomacy is far preferable to war-making. But it seems that they have no respect for the secrecy that must accompany successful diplomacy either. That, at least, is the only conclusion I can draw from their decision to once again collaborate with an accused rapist to publicize a giant batch of stolen State Department cables gathered by his disreputable organization, WikiLeaks.

I risk sounding like a stuffy, striped-pants diplomat myself if I say that the conduct of all concerned is reprehensible and beneath contempt. But that’s what it is, especially because the news value of the leaks is once again negligible. As with the previous releases of military reports, the WikiLeaks files only fill in details about what has generally already been known. Those details have the potential to cause acute embarrassment — or even end the lives of — those who have communicated with American soldiers or officials, but they do little to help the general public to understand what’s going on.

I urge you to read the whole thing.

In a way, these leaks give new meaning to Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase, “the banality of evil.”  She was talking about the horrible ordinariness of the Nazis, who clung to their middle class lives even as they engaged in unparalleled atrocities.  These leaks are a different banal evil:  even though the information released is known (Saudi fear of Iran) or stupid (e.g., Qaddafi’s blond nurse), making it mostly banal, the profound damage that results from these leaks (the deaths, the national humiliations, the destruction of necessary diplomatic ignorance) is profoundly evil.

I join with others in wondering why Assange is still alive.  I’m willing to bet, though, that now that it’s not just the Americans being humiliated, Assange’s days are numbered.

By the way, if you want more information about the leak’s contents and the security implications (worldwide) arising from the leaks, as well as links to good articles on the subject, you can’t do better than Melissa Clouthier’s post.

UPDATE:  A reminder that the newspapers aren’t utterly without morals or decency.  While they don’t want to exercise it when national security is at issue, they were happy to exercise it when climate change fraud was under legitimate attack.

UPDATE II:  Two excellent articles from Barry Rubin about Wikileaks.  As always, his optimism — allied with actual facts and sound analysis — is a useful antidote to the gloom and doom that characterizes most other writing on just about any subject.  Check out Spengler too.

UPDATE II:  Another “check it out” is Omri Ceren’s post on Israel and Iran as seen through the Wikileaks — and just how wrong the Obama administration was.  (As if that’s a big surprise.)

Are we overreacting to junk-touching?

Ace asks a question that needs to be asked, which is whether conservatives are overreacting to the TSA’s new search techniques (naked scans and intimate searches):

This has been bothering me. On one hand I’m inclined to just not like invasive pat-downs and naked body scans.

On the other hand, I can’t help but think we (especially as conservatives) are supposed to be security-conscious.

This sort of dispute is always implicit in this sort of issue — the civil libertarian side (supported by some conservatives and many left-wingers) and the security-conscious side (mostly conservatives take this side).

Although there may be some abuses, is it really the best policy to object to methods of bomb-detection which are nearly foolproof? I don’t think the body-imaging x-rays can fail to miss an object secreted on someone’s body, and even a barely-trained TSA agent can recognize a hidden object when he feels it.

Read the rest of Ace’s thoughts here, including his strong vote for including Israeli style security in the American armory.

I’m with Ace, in that I think it’s important that conservatives put their money where their mouth is when it comes to security.  I’m just dubious about whether turning the TSA’s job description into one that will attract every pervert and pedophile in America is the way to go.  Here are two major practical problems I see with the new screening:

1.  Human ingenuity will override the scans and pat-downs.  If terrorists run out of external places to hide explosives, they’ll use internal places.  We already know from prison stories about the wonderful hiding place anal and vaginal cavities, not to mention tummies, are to people determined to run something past security.  We can also count on all sorts of surgical implants.  Even a solid scar grope won’t reveal whether there’s something dangerous lurking behind that scar.  Further, considering the number of women with breast implants (and, or so I’ve heard, the increasing number of men with testicular, penile, or buttock implants), there’s no way to tell if the implant is saline or inert plastic or rubber, or if it’s something that goes boom.  This means that the humiliation and inconvenience of scans and pats aren’t necessarily going to stop anything.

2.  And then there’s the girl thing….  From puberty to menopause, once a month, women are dependent on pads and tampons.  The tampons, of course, fall into category 1, above, which is they’re internal, invisible, and potentially more lethal than just an absorbent piece of cotton.  The pads, which are external, carry with them the potential for huge embarrassment and endless inconvenience.  First, I doubt many women want every airport security person in the world to know that it’s “that time of the month.”  Second, short of escorting the woman to a restroom and having her prove that she really is having her period, how in the world can the TSA know whether the pad is legitimate or whether another panty-bomber in the making is standing there?  The same holds true for men (and women) with incontinence problems who are dependent on pads.  Once again, being humiliated isn’t going to make a difference for air safety.

The problem is that the public and the current security apparatus are stuck in a 1970s mentality, which assumes that the terrorist plans on walking away from the plane.  A terrorist who wants weapons that he can use against others, but not against himself, is going to be somewhat limited.  That’s why metal detectors, although a pain in the whatsit, were a reasonable and pretty effective response to the hijackings of the 1970s.  The new breed of terrorist, however, has no plans to survive.  If he has to turn his living tissue in a giant bomb, that’s fine with him.  (Showing that art often predicts nature, one of the classic Merrie Melodies cartoons has Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck competing in a theatrical competition for audience approval.  Daffy, in a desperate bid to win, swallows a huge variety of explosive liquids, followed by a single match.  As his ghost ascends to heaven, he regrets that his wonderful act is limited to only one performance.)

I have a friend who travels a great deal and is okay with the new security measures, because she is assuming that, despite their being so invasive, they’ll make a positive difference in air safety.   My problem is that I think they’re personally violative and they won’t make a difference.  That is, if I was reasonably convinced of their efficacy, I too might be willing to tolerate the new regs, because I find it unnerving enough to shoot through the sky in a tin can without having to worry further about the tin can taking a man-made dive.  But these searches are band aid measures.  Their very visibility makes certain that the bad guys will simply circumvent them, meaning that we’re all stripped of our sense of privacy, while the bad guys move forward into the future with exciting new ideas for death and destruction.

Real airport security — by Spartacus *UPDATED*

Sometimes, a reader leaves a comment that is too good not to elevate to post status.  This time, it was Spartacus, writing in response to my question about real ways (not stupid, embarrassing, intrusive ways) to improve airport security:

***

A childhood friend of mine got married in the Tel Aviv area in 2002. By happy coincidence, the wedding date fell squarely in the middle of my one-and-only European vacation so far, so catching one more flight over to the other end of the Med was a no-brainer. Pricewise, it made the most sense to Chunnel over to Paris and round-trip from there, where there were two options: Air France or El Al. About the same price, so toward which was I more favorably disposed, ideologically speaking? Duh. El Al it was.

Got to the airport in Paris way early, like you’re supposed to for international flights, and went to check in. The ticket agent said something about going over somewhere to answer some questions or something. Questions? OK, sure, whatever. A trim, young, friendly, and utterly charming security gal appeared from out of nowhere, led me in my confusion over to a little kiosk, and began to ask me questions. All kinds of questions, and all very enjoyably and conversationally asked. Where was I from? What did I do for a living? Why was I travelling to Israel? What did I plan to see while there? Where had I been on my vacation so far? How did I get from Point A to Point B? And from B to C? What did I see while in B? What was most enjoyable about C? Is the food good there? Oh, and how did I get from A to B again? And if I wanted to get from B to D, why did I go through C on Mode X and then switch to Mode Y when it would have been faster and cheaper just to go direct by Mode Z? (“Dang,” I thought, “I spent two months planning this vacation, and she’s right! Why didn’t I think of that?”). Oh, and how is the food in C again? Classic interrogation techniques, not unlikely learned in the IDF, and flawlessly performed by a very quick-witted security professional.

In retrospect, it all made sense. My profile: young, single, male, non-Jewish, non-Israeli, no previous flights on El Al, and travelling alone. So, yeah, they naturally wanted to talk to me. The Q&A actually lasted about 80 minutes — a fact I completely missed until looking at my watch later. Between the friendly conversational tone, the fast pace, and her crystal-blue eyes… [sigh]… it seemed like about five minutes. When we were done, she escorted me back to a security room where I could see the last stages of the examination of my backpack: 35mm film rolls were being taken out of the plastic cannisters, X-rayed, and carefully put back in; my neatly folded and rolled underwear was being neatly re-rolled exactly as it had been; and so on. No cubic centimeter of my pack had been left unexamined. But the examination of the pack was unnecessary, since by the time I got on that flight, El Al knew everything that was in my mind and in my heart.

Security-wise, the flight to Tel Aviv was uneventful until we were almost there. You know how they now ban people from lining up outside the restroom in the front? Well, I was almost all the way in the back, in between the two aisles, and a bunch of guys started gathering all around. Real Orthodox-looking types. Since we were almost there, I was beginning to wonder if they couldn’t just hold it until we landed. I was startled nearly out of my seat when they all suddenly burst out in some Hebrew song. So they weren’t really waiting for the restroom after all! I still don’t know what they were singing, but I think it was something like, “Paise be to the G-d of Abraham, Isaac and Israel! We will soon aquire the localizer signal to ILS Runway 27 and begin our pre-landing checklist!” (But coming from the guy who thought they were all going to the restroom, you might want to take that with a grain of salt.) It was interesting and different, which is cool.

My friend successfully got married, and about a week later, I was back at the airport. Just for good measure, they had me spend another very enjoyable 80 minutes of Q&A with another very attractive security gal. After being released to the departure gate, I looked out the big plate-glass window. Airplanes shifted busily around the tarmac as the pinkish glow of the coming dawn enveloped the entire scene. “Beautiful,” I thought, as I pulled out my camera. About 3.6 seconds later, another very attractive security gal quietly appeared from out of nowhere (yes, this was becoming a recurrent theme) and gently informed me that no pictures were allowed in the terminal. “Oh, sorry, I didn’t know.” But it made sense. And it showed once again that they didn’t miss a thing.

Back at Heathrow a few days later, I went up to the United counter to check in for my flight back to the States. The ticket agent, who fit all of the negative stereotypes of a DMV worker, followed the United Airlines security screening procedure — she pulled out a small card, from which she read two questions: “Are you a terr… terr… terr… Oh, whatever… Do you have any bombs with you today?” Not especially looking up to register my responses to these questions, she gave me my ticket. And the security procedure which had bothered me not in the least on my way over to England now, in comparison, made me fear for my life.

I would fly El Al again almost anytime, anywhere… maybe even Point A to Point A, just for the heck of it.

UPDATE:  This is a good companion piece to Spartacus’ El Al post.

Why airline security will always be merely offensive, and never useful

In a previous post today, in which I asked how to make airline security actually work, the clear winner was profiling, a la the Israeli system (along with some other solid suggestions, such as privatization).  But as long as the feds control airline security, that’s not going to happen.  Witness what’s going on in LA, which must have more gang activity than the next ten biggest American cities combined:

The federal government has warned the Los Angeles Police Department to do more to combat racial profiling by officers, saying the LAPD’s investigations into the practice are inadequate.

In a letter to city and police officials, the U.S. Department of Justice cites a recording of two officers being dismissive of racial profiling complaints, the Los Angeles Times reported Sunday.

When told that other officers had been accused of stopping a motorist because of his race, one officer responds, “So, what?” The second officer is heard twice saying that he “couldn’t do (his) job without racially profiling.”

The officers didn’t know they were being recorded.

Read the rest here.

Yes, racial profiling can be terribly abused.  Yes, racial profiling can be perceived by some in power positions as a green light for acting out their worst instincts.

But yes, racial profiling is an accurate, if somewhat rough indicator of certain affiliations:  You won’t find many white young men in black or Mexican gangs.  You won’t find many Jews in neo-Nazi biker groups.  You won’t find many little old ladies from the Midwest packing airplane bombs.

Yes, there are white men who long for the “people of color” gang lifestyle.  And yes, there are self-loathing Jews who would probably be happy hanging with the neo-Nazis.  And yes, there are LOLs from the Midwest who have been coopted by Islam — but it’s not likely.

Sherlock Holmes may have said that, “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth,” but first you have to eliminate the impossible and examine the probabilities of the improbable. Ignoring common sense and relying on randomness is not a way to fight crime, whether on the streets of LA or the airspace over America.

How should we improve airport security? *UPDATED*

Over at RedState, there is a post that succinctly sums up the three choices currently facing people who plan to travel to a faraway destination:

Door #1: Have nude pictures of yourself beamed to some video monitor to be viewed by a total stranger where it may or may not be stored; or,

Door #2: Allow yourself to be groped, poked, patted down, felt up, frisked, and squeezed at the hands of some police academy reject in a Smurf-blue uniform; or…

Door #3: Don’t travel.

Of course, those choices don’t arise in a vacuum.  They exist in a travel world that no one imagined prior to the 1970s, when hijackings started, and before the 21st century, when planes started being turned into bombs:  How do we protect travelers?

In the hijacking days, metal detectors made sense, as a fairly unobtrusive way to guard against guns and knives, although that approach failed miserably on 9/11.  But with the creative types at Al Qaeda using liquid explosives, putty explosives, underwear explosives, shoe explosives, etc., traditional machinery doesn’t work.  And as noted above, non-traditional approaches — nude photos and groping — are untenable to the American public.

Which leaves a question:  How do we improve airport security?  I’d love to get your answers on this one.  I hate to fly, and would prefer that my flight didn’t end with my plane exploding.  But I’m also someone who has a large zone of physical privacy, a zone that extends to my family, and I therefore find utterly repugnant the thought of nude photos and public gropes.  So what’s left in a day and age when the terrorists have gotten creative?

I’ll start the conversation with profiling, which the Israelis have used successfully for decades.  This is deep profiling.  They’re not just looking for the guy in Muslim dress.  They’re looking for profound clues about people’s background and behaviors.  I don’t know if we can get that up and running anytime soon and, given the size of our air traffic compared to the Israeli’s air traffic, I don’t know if we can spread this kind of knowledge and insight around.

Now it’s your turn….

UPDATE:  This is an appropriate companion piece to my question above airport security.

UPDATE II:  And another suggestion for non-radioactive, non-groping airport security.

Deconstructing Janet Napolitano’s fatuous statements *UPDATED*

By now, you’ve all heard that Janet Napolitano, the head of Obama’s Department of Homeland Security, is going around saying that the system worked perfectly when a guy on the US no-fly list, who had been turned in by his own father, boarded a plane and detonated a bomb, only to be foiled by a bad detonator and alert passengers.  I leave it to Jonah Goldberg to write the perfect obituary for the administration’s attempt to aggrandize itself on this one:

Understandably, the White House is trying very hard to get out in front of the would-be Christmas bomber story. The head of the Department of Homeland Security isn’t helping. I watched her on three shows and each time she was more annoying, maddening and absurd than the pevious appearance. It is her basic position that the “system worked” because the bureaucrats responded properly after the attack. That the attack was “foiled” by a bad detonator and some civilian passengers is proof, she claims, that her agency is doing everything right. That is just about the dumbest thing she could say, on the merits and politically. I would wager that not one percent of Americans think the system is “working” when terrorists successfully get bombs onto planes (and succeed in activating them). Probably even fewer think it’s fair that they have to take off their shoes, endure delays and madness while a known Islamic radical — turned in by his own father — can waltz onto a plane (and into the country). DHS had no role whatsoever in assuring that this bomb didn’t go off. By her logic if the bomb had gone off, the system would have “worked” since it has done everything right.

UPDATE: Wait! Wait! This just in: The system does in fact work. Known black Muslim security threats may be getting a pass, but our security forces are still targeting the real threat:  they’re going after rich blond women, just the way they should.

Join Keep America Safe

William Kristol, Liz Cheney (Dick Cheney’s daughter), Debra Burlingame, Charles F. “Chic” Burlingame III’s sister (his plane was hijacked into the Pentagon on 9/11) have started Keep America Safe, an organization specifically aimed at tracking national security issues.  The mission statement is simple, and should resonate with every American who believes in American exceptionalism, recognizes that we are engaged in a war to the death with the forces of radical Islam, and fears greatly a future in which Obama bows to dictators, betrays democratic allies, and passively accepts nuclear proliferation:

The mission of Keep America Safe is to provide information for concerned Americans about critical national security issues. Keep America Safe seeks to influence public policy by encouraging dialogue between American citizens and their elected representatives in order to produce legislation and executive action that enhances the national security of the United States.

The United States remains a nation at war. We face a growing threat from rogue regimes that seek or have already obtained nuclear weapons. America’s interests are challenged by an authoritarian China, a resurgent Russia, and dictators in our own hemisphere who ally themselves with our adversaries. Amidst the great challenges to America’s security and prosperity, the current administration too often seems uncertain, wishful, irresolute, and unwilling to stand up for America, our allies and our interests.

Since 9/11, the United States Government, through our armed forces and our intelligence and law enforcement professionals, has succeeded in preventing any further attacks on the American homeland. This is a major achievement. By turning away from the policies that have kept us safe, by treating terrorism as a law enforcement matter, giving foreign terrorists the same rights as American citizens, launching investigations of CIA agents, cutting defense spending, breaking faith with our allies and attempting to appease our adversaries, the current administration is weakening the nation, and making it more difficult for us to defend our security and our interests.

Keep America Safe believes the United States can only defeat our adversaries and defend our interests from a position of strengh. We know that America has, for 233 years, been an unparalleled force for good in the world, that our fighting forces are the best the world has ever known, and that the world is a safer place when America is trusted by our allies and feared and respected by our enemies. Keep America Safe will make the case for an unapologetic approach to fighting terrorism around the world, for victory in the wars this country fights, for democracy and human rights, and for a strong American military that is needed in the dangerous world in which we live.

Joining is easy.  Simply go to the home page and, in the upper right hand corner, fill in your email address and your zip code.  Press a button and, voila!, you’ve become a part of an important new voice in American politics.